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The Classical Notion of  
Competition Revisited
Neri Salvadori and Rodolfo Signorino
The gravitation of market prices toward natural prices in all markets char-
acterized by free competition was widely affirmed by the classical authors, 
despite the lack of a formal proof. In the wake of the revival of interest in 
classical economics fostered by the publication of Production of Com-
modities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa 1960), since the mid-1970s a 
vast literature has blossomed concerning the stability of long-period equi-
librium within multisectoral models of classical inspiration. (For a survey 
of this literature, see Bellino 2011.) Besides the formal results achieved on 
the subject of stability, the debate on gravitation has stimulated an in-
depth investigation of the classical notion of market competition (Arena 
1978; Semmler 1984; Steedman 1984; Duménil and Lévy 1987). This 
investigation has also highlighted some unsatisfactory aspects in the lat-
ter, particularly the actual process of market price determination in a situ-
ation of market disequilibrium:
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1. [The originality of the classical theory of free competition] is not, however, able to hide 
certain inadequacies: the classical political economy clashes with the central problem of the 
articulation between market prices and natural prices. The solution of such difficulties 
requires a new definition of this articulation (our translation).
Little is said concerning the actual process [which governs the func-
tioning of the market for commodities]. For example, it is not clear who 
is changing prices, what information is used, when this change occurs, 
what the outcome is on the market etc. (Duménil and Lévy 1987, 136)
[L’originalità della teoria classica della libera concorrenza] non è però 
in grado di nascondere certe insufficienze: l’economia politica classica 
si scontra infatti con il problema centrale dell’articolazione tra prezzi di 
mercato e prezzi naturali. La soluzione di queste difficoltà richiede una 
nuova definizione di questa articolazione. (Arena 1978, 323)1
The aim of this article is to detect and highlight those elements present 
in classical texts that may be fruitfully employed to overcome the above 
drawbacks of the classical view of market competition. Moreover, as recent 
commentators of classical economics have emphasized, in a situation of 
disequilibrium, when the quantity of a given commodity brought to the 
market differs from Smithian effectual demand, the likely outcome is that 
of a dispersion of prices: “Whereas natural price is by definition a singular 
magnitude for each kind of commodity, the competitive processes whereby 
market prices deviate from natural price under conditions of market 
imbalance are consistent with, indeed likely to cause, transactions at non-
uniform prices. That is to say, market price as literally the actual prices 
at which transactions occur when there is such market imbalance, is not 
in general a singular magnitude” (Aspromourgos 2009, 72; see also pages 
85 and 88). Accordingly, we claim that the classical theory of market prices 
gives scope to the analysis of the behavior of the agents acting in situa-
tions of market imbalance through some of the analytical tools and formal 
results achieved by the modern game-theoretic approach to oligopoly the-
ory, namely, the notion of mixed (i.e., nondeterministic) price-strategy.
In what follows, we distinguish and compare two different conceptions 
of market competition: the Walrasian notion of perfect competition and 
the classical notion of free competition, focusing in particular on Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx. We stress that while the Walrasian notion may be 
described as an equilibrium state in which atomistic agents treat prices 
parametrically, the classical notion is a situation in which agents employ 
their market power by setting prices strategically. The absence of a price-
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2. The basic model used to represent the classical gravitation process is the so-called 
cross-dual model, in which (1) sectoral outputs change in response to differentials in the rates 
of profit; (2) market prices change in response to excess demand of the various commodities. 
While the first adjustment process is widely accepted as a fair formalization of the classical 
principle of capital mobility, the second appears as a mechanical transposition of the Walra-
sian price adjustment process and is the ultimate culprit behind the intrinsic instability of 
cross-dual gravitation processes. The present article proposes a totally different market price 
formation and should be able to resolve the instability problem envisaged in this literature.
taking assumption in the classical authors is the main reason why the 
theoretical difficulties besetting the Walrasian notion outside market-
clearing equilibrium do not plague the classical notion as well. Yet though 
for the classical authors price undercutting or outbidding are the typical 
phenomena that occur in any market characterized by free competition, it 
is fair to say that they went no farther than to provide only some unsys-
tematic guidelines on how to analyze in due detail the competitive process 
of market price determination. Among other things, we show that Marx’s 
extensive use of metaphors and numerical examples hides the modern tax-
onomy of buyers’ market, sellers’ market, and mixed strategy equilibrium 
in the capacity space of a standard Bertrand duopoly model. In particular, 
we argue that Marx was conscious that between the buyers’ market, in 
which the price is determined by the reservation price of sellers, and the 
sellers’ market, in which the price is determined by the reservation price 
of buyers, there is something in which the price is not unique and any 
equilibrium can concern only distributions of probability (mixed strate-
gies) on the behavior of the traders. We substantiate this fact by using a 
formalism derived from the contemporary analysis of Bertrand competi-
tion. (The elements required to identify a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion to separate these three different market outcomes are sketched in an 
appendix.) We are aware that our analysis, once duly developed, needs to 
be related to contemporary gravitation literature. Yet we defer investiga-
tion of this issue to a future paper.2
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 1 compares two differ-
ent notions of the concept of market competition, the classical notion of 
free competition and the neoclassical notion of perfect competition, and 
highlights some problematic aspects of the latter, absent in the former. 
Sections 2 and 3 assess the classical theory of free competition, as devel-
oped by Adam Smith and Karl Marx, with particular concern for market 
price determination. Section 4 investigates how the classical notion of 
competition has percolated into the modern literature on so-called Ber-
trand competition. Section 5 concludes.
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1. Two Different Notions of Market  
Competition or Just One?
Few commentators would disagree with the following statement: “Although 
the concept of competition has always been central to economic think-
ing . . . it is one that has taken on a number of interpretations and meanings, 
many of them vague” (Vickers 1995, 3). In particular, Vickers distinguishes 
the notion of perfect competition—a “seemingly tranquil equilibrium state 
in which well-informed agents treat prices parametrically”—from the 
“original and ‘real’ concept” of competition, a “rivalrous behaviour with 
respect to prices and other variables in a world characterized by flux, 
uncertainty and disequilibrium” (7).
Despite the differences between these two notions, many authors have 
come (more or less explicitly) to consider the classical notion of free 
competition nothing but a primitive and pre-analytical version of the neo-
classical theory of perfect competition, a version still imbued with casual 
empiricism: “It is a remarkable fact that the concept of competition did not 
begin to receive explicit and systematic attention in the main stream of 
economics until 1871. This concept . . . was long treated with the kindly 
casualness with which one treats of the intuitively obvious. . . . ‘Compe-
tition’ entered economics from common discourse, and for long it con-
noted only the independent rivalry of two or more persons” (Stigler 1957, 
1). Such an interpretation has deeply influenced many of the leading expo-
nents of neoclassical economics. (See, e.g., Arrow and Hahn 1971, in par-
ticular chapter 1, “Historical Introduction,” and Samuelson 1978.) Even 
outside the neoclassical camp this interpretation has found supporters, 
such as Nicholas Kaldor (1972, 1241), when he claims that “one can 
trace a more or less continuous development of price theory from the 
subsequent chapters of Smith [the fourth chapter of the Wealth of Nations] 
through Ricardo, Walras, Marshall, right up to Debreu and the most 
sophisticated of present-day Americans.” Vickers (1995, 7) himself con-
cludes that “the claim that there are two concepts of competition is some-
what misleading.”
Nonetheless, historians of economic thought who have endorsed an 
alternative point of view have not been lacking. Paul McNulty (1967, 397) 
not only argued that the classical notion of competition as a behavioral 
process is radically different from the neoclassical notion of competition 
as an equilibrium state but also went so far as to claim that the neoclas-
sical assumption of individual price-taking behavior is entirely alien to 
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3. From this point of view, McNulty’s interpretation is akin to those of Samuel Hollander 
(1973) and John Eatwell (1987). The former claims that “the Smithian conception of competi-
tion must be carefully distinguished from the modern conception which envisages sellers (and 
consumers) as ‘price-takers’ rather than ‘price-makers’” (126), while the latter points out that 
“the characteristics of ‘perfect’ competition (notably the conditions which ensure price-taking) 
are often read back, illegitimately, into Classical discussions of competition” (63). See also High 
2001, xiv–xv; and Machovec 2005, chap. 8. While Blaug defines Arrow and Hahn’s 1971 tribute 
to Adam Smith as a forerunner of perfect competition (and Pareto optimality) analysis no less 
than “a historical travesty” (Blaug 2001, 153), a more balanced position is endorsed by Michael 
Bradley (2010, 238), who argues that “Smithian ‘liberty’ contains the seeds of perfect competi-
tion, but perfect competition is different from ‘perfect liberty’ in some critical respects, particu-
larly the nature of competition and the role of entrepreneurs.”
4. McNulty (1967, 395–96) provides a discussion of Cantillon and Turgot as forerunners of 
Smith on competition. An extensive treatment of the evolution of the notions of price, cost, 
and competition before Smith may be found in Aspromourgos 2009, 101–10.
the classical analysis:3 “Smith’s concept of competition was decidedly not 
one in which the firm was passive with respect to price but was, rather, one 
in which the market moved toward equilibrium through the active price 
responses of its various participants.” Therefore, what in the previous 
interpretation appears simply as a process of analytical refinement, in 
McNulty’s view is no less than “a basic conceptual change” (397). More-
over, McNulty adds that, pace George Stigler, the classical notion of com-
petition is far from being derived from casual empiricism. Smith is the 
great systematizer of the analysis of the concept of market competition 
carried out by a series of authors before him (most notably, Cantillon and 
Turgot) and his specific contribution was to raise the concept of compe-
tition to a “general organizing principle of economic society. . . . After 
Smith’s great achievement, the concept of competition became quite lit-
erally the sine qua non of economic reasoning” (McNulty 1967, 396–97; 
see also McNulty 1968, 646–47).4
McNulty’s interpretation raises the matter of investigating the theo-
retical conditions that have led to such a dramatic change of meaning in 
the original notion of competition. A first step in this direction may be 
found in the distinction between two different notions of economic sci-
ence: (1) economics as the science that studies a system of forces and 
(2) economics as the science that studies a system of relations—a dis-
tinction introduced by Marco Dardi (1983) that was recently emphasized 
by Nicola Giocoli (2005):
According to the system-of-forces (SOF) view, economics is a disci-
pline whose main subject is the analysis of the economic processes 
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generated by market and not-market forces, including—but by no 
means exclusively—the processes leading the system to an equilib-
rium. According to the system-of-relations (SOR) view, economics is a 
discipline whose main subject is the investigation of the existence and 
properties of economic equilibria in terms of the validation and mutual 
consistency of given formal conditions, but that has little if anything to 
say about the meaningfulness of these equilibria for the analysis of 
real economic systems. (Giocoli 2005, 180)
According to Giocoli, the SOF view was the dominant vision up to the 
years between the two world wars, while the SOR view gained popularity 
only in the second postwar period when considerable intellectual effort 
was devoted to the project of a full axiomatization of economic science 
(180). Similarly, in a series of papers Blaug (1997, 2002, and 2003) indi-
cated in the formalist revolution of the 1950s and the parallel rise to dom-
inance of the Walrasian general equilibrium theory the two driving forces 
that led to the decline of the classical (and early neoclassical) notion of 
competition as a process and its replacement with the modern notion of 
competition as an end-state (with the associated first and second funda-
mental theorems of welfare economics).
Thus it may be claimed that the semantic shift in the notion of competi-
tion is part of a more general process of redefining central categories and 
concepts of economic analysis started in the 1930s with the rediscovery of 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Donzelli 1990, chap. 9) and fully 
accomplished in the late 1970s with the rediscovery of the Nash equilib-
rium concept (Giocoli 2003, chap. 5): the classical notion of market com-
petition makes little sense outside the SOF view, while the Walrasian 
notion of competition perfectly fits the theoretical standards set by the 
SOR view.
There are at least two reasons why the distinction between the classical 
notion of competition and the neoclassical one and careful analysis of the 
theoretical domain of the latter is not simply a historiographical exercise:
 1.  The neoclassical theory of perfect competition carries with it some 
theoretical difficulties alien to the classical notion of free competition.
 2.  The classical notion of competition can be made analytically precise 
in terms of the modern concept of mixed strategies equilibrium.
The final part of this section is devoted to substantiating point 1 above, 
while we defer analysis of point 2 to section 4.
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5. From this perspective Edgeworth’s concept of equilibrium (core) and his adjustment pro-
cess in disequilibrium (recontracting) are superior to the Walrasian ones: “The recontracting 
process . . . is based on the same behavioral postulate, blocking by coalitions, that is used to 
define the solution concept, the core [The core is defined to be the set of all unblocked alloca-
tions. That is, it is the set of all allocations such that no subset of the participants can improve 
the position of all its members by withdrawing from the system and using only resources of its 
members]. This seems to be a desirable property. It is, however, not shared by most studies of 
disequilibrium price dynamics because these involve price changes brought about by a market 
manager or other artificiality. Prices do not vary as a consequence of the maximizing behavior 
of individuals” (Green 1974, 22).
6. Current textbooks also acknowledge this fact: “Strictly speaking, it is equilibrium market 
prices that [consumers and producers] will regard as unaffected by their actions. . . . For the 
price-taking assumption to be appropriate, what we want is that [consumers and producers] have 
no incentive to alter prices that, if taken as given, equate demand and supply (we have already 
seen that [consumers and producers] do have an incentive to alter prices that do not equate 
demand and supply) (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 314n1, 315; emphasis added).
As pointed out by Jerry Green (1974), every market equilibrium con-
cept requires the specification of a consistent set of behavioral postulates 
that prescribe what happens in equilibrium and what happens outside 
equilibrium. In the Walrasian framework, the behavioral postulates that 
define the situation of equilibrium differ from those that define the adjust-
ment mechanism in disequilibrium. As regards the former, the behavioral 
postulate is that every agent assumes market prices as parametrically 
given and, on the basis of such prices and other constraints, maximizes his 
or her own objective function. By contrast, in disequilibrium, the behav-
ioral postulate is that a meta-agent, the auctioneer, determines market 
prices according to market excess demands. Moreover, no transactions 
among the agents are allowed to take place during the adjustment process.5 
As a consequence, the price-taking behavior assumption implies that each 
individual firm in a given market has no incentive to set a price different 
from the ruling market price and has no incentive to carry on transactions 
at a price other than the Walrasian market-clearing price. Thus such an 
assumption drastically reduces the theoretical domain of the theory to 
equilibrium, market-clearing situations.6
To our knowledge, Kenneth Arrow (1959) was the first to highlight the 
logical difficulties besetting the neoclassical theory of perfect competition:
the Law [of supply and demand, Arrow’s equation 3: dp/dt = h(S − D) 
with h’ < 0 and h(0) = 0] is not on the same logical level as the hypoth-
eses underlying equation 1 [D = f (p) and S = g(p)]. It is not explained 
whose decision it is to change prices in accordance with equation 3. 
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7. D (S) is the quantity demanded (supplied) of a given commodity X, p its price, f(p) and 
g(p) the demand and supply functions, respectively, while dp/dt = h(S − D) is the time deriva-
tive that formalizes the law of motion of market price in relation to market excess demand.
Each individual participant in the economy is supposed to take prices 
as given and determine his or her choices as to purchases and sales 
accordingly; there is no one left over whose job it is to make a deci-
sion on price. (Arrow 1959, 43)7
In short, for Arrow in the perfect competition setup there is no place 
left for “a rational decision with respect to prices” thus implying the con-
clusion that “perfect competition can really prevail only at equilibrium” 
(41). The solution proposed by Arrow to study market price dynamics out-
side market-clearing equilibrium consists in turning to the theory of the 
monopoly: “When supply and demand do not balance, even in an objec-
tively competitive market, the individual firms are in the position of 
monopolists as far as the imperfect elasticity of demand for their products 
is concerned” (46). However, Arrow claims that standard monopoly the-
ory must be modified so as to remove the assumption that monopolists 
know perfectly their own demand curve (besides their own cost curves): 
“Uncertainty [as to the demand curve] is a crucial consideration in the 
theory of monopolistic price adjustment” (44). In such circumstances, 
monopolists will vary their own price, in a process of trial and error, until 
they find the price that maximizes their expected profits.
For our purpose, the salient points of Arrow’s analysis are the following:
 1.  Jevons’ law of indifference, which states that there is only one price 
ruling in a competitive market, ceases to be valid in disequilibrium: 
“Although the broad tendency will be for prices to rise when demand 
exceeds supply, there can easily be a considerable dispersion of 
prices among different sellers of the same commodity” (46–47).
 2.  By assuming that competition takes place on both sides of the mar-
ket, that is, competition among sellers and competition among buy-
ers, a buyers’ market may be distinguished from a sellers’ market: 
“By a parallel argument each buyer on a market with an inequality 
between supply and demand can be regarded as a monopsonist. . . . 
In disequilibrium, the market consists of a number of monopolists 
facing a number of monopsonists. The most general picture is that 
of a shifting set of bilateral monopolies. . . . In general, it is reason-
able to suppose that if the selling side of the market is much more 
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8. Arrow’s 1959 contribution with its emphasis on the role of monopoly theory in explain-
ing competitive price convergence is the ideal starting point for the subsequent neo-Walrasian 
literature on disequilibrium trading (see Donzelli 1990, chap. 9).
9. As is well known, Ricardo (1951, 91) devotes to the distinction between natural and 
market magnitudes just the short chapter 4 of his Principles, where he explicitly refers to 
chapter 7 of WN, where “all that concerns this question is most ably treated.”
concentrated than the buying side, the main force in changing prices 
will be the monopolistic behavior of the sellers. . . . Similarly, if the 
buying side of the market is the more concentrated, as in non-union-
ized labor markets, the dynamics will come from that side” (47; 
emphasis added).
In the following two sections we make it clear that these two elements of 
Arrow’s contribution may be found in Smith’s and, even more explicitly, 
in Marx’s treatment of market prices, thus paving the way for a restate-
ment of the classical notion of competition through contemporary game-
theoretic analysis.8
2. The Classical Notion of Free Competition: 
Adam Smith
George Richardson (1975, 350–51) has convincingly argued that “compe-
tition features within The Wealth of Nations in two different contexts; 
first, in the account given of the balancing of supply and demand in par-
ticular markets, and, secondly, in the explanation of structural and techno-
logical development. Smith offers us in effect both a theory of economic 
equilibrium and a theory of economic evolution; and in each of these com-
petition has a key role to play.” In what follows we concentrate on the 
static aspect of the Smithian notion of market competition, concerned 
with market price determination, leaving aside its dynamic aspect (see 
Lavezzi 2003).
As far as the classical notion of market competition is concerned, the 
locus classicus is book 1, chapter 7 of Smith’s ([1776] 1976) Wealth of 
Nations (WN).9 Smith’s working assumption is that it is possible to clas-
sify the economic forces in action in a given moment into two broad cat-
egories, (1) those erratic and short-lived forces that determine the market 
values both of commodity prices and of the distributive variables and 
(2) those systematic and persistent that determine the natural values of 
the same magnitudes. Classical economists generally hold the view that 
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10. Ricardo (1951, 91–92) clearly states that the focus of his analysis is only natural magni-
tudes: “Having fully acknowledged the temporary effects which, in particular employments of 
capital, may be produced on the prices of commodities, as well on the wages of labour, and the 
profits of stock, by accidental causes, without influencing the general prices of commodities, 
wages or profits, since these effects are equally operative in all stages of society, we will leave 
them entirely out of consideration, whilst we are treating of the laws which regulate natural 
prices, natural wages and natural profits, effects totally independent of these accidental causes.”
only the latter can be the proper subject of scientific inquiry (Ciccone 
1999, 70).10
The data from which the Smithian argument starts are the natural rates 
of wages, profits, and rents that, sectoral specificities apart, depend mainly 
on the conditions of prosperity of the economic system under scrutiny, its 
“advancing, stationary, or declining condition” (WN I.vii.1). The natural 
price of (re)production of the various commodities derives from the sum-
mation of these three elements. The natural price is therefore a magnitude 
that is not immediately formed in the market but that, given some appro-
priate conditions, may come true in the market. Indeed, the natural price 
constitutes a sort of a floor for the market price in the sense that the latter 
cannot remain for long below the former without seriously jeopardizing 
the reproduction of the commodity in question: “The competition of the 
different dealers obliges them all to accept of [the natural price]; but does 
not oblige them to accept of less. . . . The natural price, or the price of free 
competition . . . is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion, 
indeed, but for any considerable time together . . . is the lowest which the 
sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their 
business” (WN I.vii.11). The theoretical importance of natural prices con-
sists in providing a guide to the theorist for explaining the dynamic path 
followed by market prices: “The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the 
central price to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravi-
tating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good 
deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. 
But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this 
center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it” 
(WN I.vii.15). 
To study the genesis of market prices and the existing relations between 
market prices and natural prices, Smith introduces the concept of effec-
tual demand, that is, “the demand of those who are willing to pay the 
natural price of the commodity.” It is to be stressed that the relationship 
between the quantity brought to the market and the effectual demand 
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11. See Ricardo’s (1951, 1:382) rejection of the opinion that price depends solely on the 
proportion between these two quantities.
12. Differences between the classical and the neoclassical theories of value and distribu-
tion have been emphasized by such authors as Krishna Bharadwaj (1978), Alessandro Ronca-
glia (1978), and Pierangelo Garegnani (1984). Nonetheless, historiographical controversies 
are still very much alive: see Blaug 1999 and 2009 versus Kurz and Salvadori 2002 and 2010.
13. This consideration may explain Ricardo’s (1951 1:90; emphasis added) emphasis on the 
effectiveness of the adjustment mechanism: “When we look to the markets of a large town, and 
observe how regularly they are supplied both with home and foreign commodities, in the quan-
tity in which they are required, under all circumstances of varying demand . . . without often 
producing either the effect of a glut from too abundant a supply, or an enormously high price 
from the supply being unequal to the demand, we must confess that the principle which appor-
tions capital to each trade in the precise amount that is required, is more active than is gener-
ally supposed.”
determines only the market price of a commodity and not also its natural 
price.11 Moreover, “demand” and “supply” are treated by Smith as given 
quantities and not as functional relationships between price and quantity 
characterized by well-defined formal properties, as they would be in the 
neoclassical theory (Garegnani 1983; Aspromourgos 2009, 83–84).12
Given the unplanned nature of market economies, at the end of a pro-
ductive cycle, entrepreneurs may not face in the market a demand able to 
absorb the whole of their production at the natural price (at least). This 
requires the specification of an adjustment mechanism powerful enough 
to bring about effective convergence to a situation in which the produced 
quantity coincides with the effectual demand: in the absence of such a 
mechanism, natural prices may not constitute a reliable guide to explain 
the movements of market prices.13
In short, the adjustment mechanism envisaged by classical authors is as 
follows. At the end of a productive cycle, the entrepreneur brings to the 
market a given quantity of produced commodity resulting from the pro-
duction decisions taken at the beginning of the cycle just concluded. Of 
course, this quantity cannot be modified to adjust to the demand actually 
encountered on the market. Thus the adjustment variable is constituted by 
the commodity’s selling price. Smith assumes that, in the presence of a 
gap between production and effectual demand, a sort of auction starts 
among the agents that happen to be on (what we today would call the) long 
side of the market: such agents are prepared to offer higher and higher 
prices (in case of excess demand) or lower and lower prices (in the case of 
excess supply).
Once the market price of any commodity happens to be different 
from its natural price, this causes an imbalance in the distributive sphere 
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14. However, classical economists were perfectly aware of the existence of profit and wage 
rate differentials. For a modern treatment, see Kurz and Salvadori 1995, chapter 11.
in the sense that the remunerations of those people that have contributed 
to the production of the commodity prove different from their respective 
natural values. In the absence of entry/exit barriers and in the presence 
of market transparency the difference between the market price and the 
natural price brings about (1) an intersectoral reallocation of economic 
resources in search of the highest market remuneration and (2) a variation 
in the produced quantity of the commodity in the following periods. This 
process comes to a halt only when the produced quantity and demanded 
quantity balance in correspondence of the natural price and the market 
values of wages, profits, and rent equal their respective natural values.14 
Therefore the imbalance in the sphere of circulation (discrepancy between 
natural price and market price of a commodity) spills over to the sphere 
of distribution (discrepancy between natural values and market values 
of wages, profits, and rent) and, finally, to the sphere of production (inter-
sectoral reallocation of productive resources and variation in quantities 
produced in the following periods).
The assumed tendency of market values toward their respective natural 
values is based on two assumptions: (1) the owners of the employed inputs 
consider, besides the outlay costs, also the opportunity costs in their deci-
sions as to where to allocate their economic resources (Aspromourgos 
2009, 67, 98) and (2) there are but negligible barriers to the intersectoral 
mobility of economic resources (91):
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is 
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the 
profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to 
market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for 
what may be called its natural price. The commodity is then sold pre-
cisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who 
brings it to market; for though in common language what is called the 
prime costs of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the 
person who is to sell it again, yet if he sell it at a price which does not 
allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evi-
dently a loser by the trade; since by employing his stock in some other 
way he might have made that profit. . . . Though the price, therefore, 
which leaves him this profit is not always the lowest at which the dealer 
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may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at which he is likely to 
sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect lib-
erty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases. (WN 
I.vii.6; emphasis added)
The above shows that Smith devotes much care to determining natu-
ral values and to the gravitation process of market magnitudes to their 
natural counterparts. The same cannot be maintained as regards the 
question of market price determination, particularly when the market is 
not in a situation of long-period equilibrium. Taking stock of Smith’s 
sparse hints on this subject it is possible to point out what follows.
First, in those markets in which competition is not free (e.g., because 
of legal monopoly and/or the presence of a guild, a collusive agreement, 
a law or a rule that somehow prevents economic agents allocating their 
resources in the sector they prefer) or where there are industrial secrets, 
entrepreneurs voluntarily limit the produced quantity so that the market 
is left understocked and the market price stays artificially high:
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, 
and all those laws which restrain, in particular employments, the com-
petition to smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have 
the same tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged 
monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes 
of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities 
above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and 
the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their nat-
ural rate. (WN I.vii.28) 
Conversely, where competition is free and industrial secrets absent, 
price undercutting starts as soon as at least two competitors are present in 
the market. This process is amplified by increasing the number of com-
petitors, since this fact makes the establishment of a collusive agreement 
more unlikely:
The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold in a 
particular town is limited by the demand of that town and its neigh-
bourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the grocery 
trade cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If this 
capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will 
tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of 
one only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would 
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be just so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, 
in order to raise the price, just so much the less. (WN II.v.7)
Second, Smith’s explanation for the determination of market prices in 
situations of disequilibrium includes not only elements that are seemingly 
the fruit of a casual observation and that he does not analyze in greater 
detail (the wealth of the buyers and their desire to get the commodity ver-
sus the necessity of the sellers to dispose of their own commodities) but 
also elements that he instead systematically applies in his analysis of the 
various markets. Of the latter, the most significant is the relative number 
of sellers and buyers and their relative ability to make a binding agree-
ment. The market price will be high or low depending on whether buyers 
are more numerous than sellers (and vice versa): the buyers “bid against 
one another” offering higher and higher prices, the sellers “bid against one 
another” offering lower and lower prices. The relative number of the buy-
ers in relation to the sellers is therefore the crucial element: every time that 
the agents on one side of the market are few and are able to communicate 
(e.g., because they operate in the same place such as a town) while the 
agents on the other side of the market are many and are unable to com-
municate (e.g., because they are isolated and scattered in the countryside), 
the bargaining from which the market price springs will obviously be 
more favorable to the former. This is particularly evident in Smith’s analy-
sis of the labor market:
What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the 
contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are 
by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the mas-
ters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine 
in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour. It is 
not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all 
ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the disputes, and force the 
other into compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in 
number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, autho-
rises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits 
those of the workmen. . . . When in any country the demand for those 
who live by wages; labourers, journeymen, servants of every kind, is 
continually increasing; when every year furnishes employment for to 
greater number than had been employed the year before, the work-
men have no occasion to combine in order to raise their wages. The 
scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid 
against one another, in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break 
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15. Marx’s treatment of competition in this passage echoes James Steuart’s notion of double 
competition. Marx was well acquainted with the work of Steuart, with whom he often took issue 
(Denis 1999). On Steuart’s notion of double competition, see Menudo and Tortajada 2009.
through the natural combination of masters not to raise wages. (WN 
I.viii.11–12, 17)
In the following section we show how Marx draws on and develops 
these elements of Smith’s treatment of market prices.
3. The Classical Notion of Free Competition: 
Karl Marx
In chapter 3 of Wage-Labour and Capital (Marx [1847] 1933) it is possi-
ble to find a vivid description of price determination in the market of a raw 
material, cotton. We think that such a description provides a clue to the 
young Marx’s view of the competitive process. The chapter bears the title 
“By what is the price of a commodity determined?” and Marx’s answer is 
the quite conventional one: “By the competition between buyers and sell-
ers, by the relation of the demand to the supply, of the call to the offer” 
(21). Yet, immediately after, he adds that “the competition by which the 
price of a commodity is determined is threefold” (21; emphasis added). 
The first element highlighted by Marx is competition among the sellers: 
“Whoever sells commodities of the same quality most cheaply, is sure to 
drive the other sellers from the field and to secure the greatest market for 
himself. . . . [It is competition among the sellers] which forces down the 
price of the commodities offered by them” (21). The second element is 
competition among the buyers that “causes the price of the proffered com-
modities to rise” (21). These two aspects of competition are not considered 
sufficient to fully determine the outcome of the competitive process. In 
fact, Marx adds a third and last element:
Finally, there is competition between the buyers and the sellers: these 
wish to purchase as cheaply as possible, those to sell as dearly as pos-
sible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will 
depend upon the relations between the two above-mentioned camps 
of competitors—i.e., upon whether the competition in the army of sell-
ers is stronger. Industry leads two great armies into the field against 
each other, and each of these again is engaged in a battle among its 
own troops in its own ranks. The army among whose troops there is 
less fighting, carries off the victory over the opposing host. (21)15
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We claim that the metaphor of the two armies that, at the one and the 
same time, are engaged in fighting one another and in their own ranks, 
coupled with the suggestion that the result of the battle is eventually 
decided by the interplay of these two levels of fighting, paves the way to 
an interesting analytical intuition. In our view Marx’s rhetoric foreshad-
ows the modern notion of a mixed strategy equilibrium: the outcome of 
market competition needs not be univocally determined, even if optimal 
(mixed) strategies are.
To clarify his thought Marx goes on to provide a concrete example. 
Marx’s choice of a raw material market for this didactic purpose is illumi-
nating. In the market of a consumption good it is quite obvious to assume 
a multitude of atomistic buyers. In such a case, competition among buyers 
would be reduced to their reservation prices and, eventually, described 
through a demand curve. It may not be so in the case of a raw material 
market, where the number of buyers may exceed that of sellers, and, in 
some cases, it is even possible to reverse the image of atomistic buyers to 
that of atomistic sellers. Marx’s example starts with the analysis of what, 
in modern terminology, is called a sellers’ market: “Let us suppose that 
there are 100 bales of cotton in the market and at the same time purchas-
ers for 1,000 bales of cotton” (21). The fact that the demand is many (ten!) 
times greater than the supply is very likely to be intentional: if there were 
100 bales and purchasers for 110, conditions would have not been, in 
Marx’s opinion, those of a sellers’ market. On the contrary, 100 to 1,000 is 
considered enough to obtain that
the cotton sellers, who perceive the troops of the enemy in the most vio-
lent contention among themselves, and who therefore are fully assured 
of the sale of their whole 100 bales, will beware of pulling one another’s 
hair in order to force down the price of cotton at the very moment in 
which their opponents race with one another to screw it up high. So, all 
of a sudden, peace reigns in the army of sellers. They stand opposed to 
the buyers like one man, fold their arms in philosophic contentment and 
their claims would find no limit did not the offers of even the most 
importunate of buyers have a very definite limit. (22)
Obviously, the ratio of 1 to 10 is, in itself, neither a necessary nor a suf-
ficient condition. This is not the place to find a necessary and sufficient 
condition in general, yet an attempt to pinpoint the elements required for 
such a condition can be made with the help of a simple symbolism. This is 
attempted in a very special case in the appendix. Going back to the exam-
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ple, Marx continues by introducing the buyers’ market: “It is well known 
that the opposite case, with the opposite result, happens more frequently. 
Great excess of supply over demand; desperate competition among the 
sellers, and a lack of buyers; forced sales of commodities at ridiculously 
low prices” (22). Marx’s text reveals that, for him, the buyers’ market and 
sellers’ market are not contiguous in the sense that between them there is 
something, but apart from the metaphor of the two armies, his readers are 
just left with the obvious remark that “in the same proportion in which 
[competition among the sellers] decreases, the competition among the 
buyers increases. Result: a more or less considerable rise in the prices of 
commodities” (22).
The Marxian text continues by introducing long-period considerations, 
that is, the gravitation of market prices toward prices of production (here 
Marx uses the expression costs of production) as a consequence of capital 
migration from (into) those sectors where market prices are below (above) 
costs of production. Yet in Marx’s view, market prices are not to be dis-
missed lightly as theoretically insignificant. Marx, in fact, goes so far as to 
claim that the typical market outcome is a market price above or below 
costs of production, while the equality between the two should be consid-
ered an exception:
The determination of price by the cost of production is not to be under-
stood in the sense of the bourgeois economists. The economists say that 
the average price of commodities equals the cost of production: that is 
the law. The anarchic movement, in which the rise is compensated for 
by a fall and the fall by a rise, they regard as an accident. We might just 
as well consider the fluctuations as the law, and the determination of the 
price by cost of production as an accident—as is, in fact, done by cer-
tain other economists. But it is precisely these fluctuations which, 
viewed more closely, carry the most frightful devastation in their train 
and, like an earthquake, cause bourgeois society to shake to its very 
foundations—it is precisely these fluctuations that force the price to 
conform to the cost of production. In the totality of this disorderly 
movement is to be found its order. In the total course of this industrial 
anarchy, in this circular movement, competition balances, as it were, 
the one extravagance by the other. (24)
The reader might think that the elder Marx, equipped with an improved 
understanding of the classical notion of prices of production and with a 
more mature version of his own theory of labor-value, would not have 
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16. “No matter what may be the way in which prices are regulated, the result always is the 
following: 1) The law of value dominates the movements of prices, . . . 2) The average profit 
which determines the prices of production must always be approximately equal to that quan-
tity of surplus-value, which falls to the share of a certain individual capital in its capacity as 
an aliquot part of the total social capital” (II.X.17–18). (All references to Capital give part 
number, chapter number, paragraph number.)
endorsed the foregoing analysis by the young Marx. We think that this is 
not the case, as witnessed by book 3, chapter 10 of Capital (Marx [1894] 
1909). This chapter, bearing the title “Compensation of the Average 
Rate of Profit by Competition. Market Prices and Market Values. Surplus-
profit,” is located in part 2, where Marx is confronted with the (insur-
mountable) problem of reconciling the origin of profit from surplus value 
with a uniform rate of profit and a uniform rate of surplus value among 
sectors. This is not the place to provide a thorough assessment of this 
chapter. It suffices to note the following.
After identifying in II.X.14 the conditions to be met in order that “the 
prices at which commodities are exchanged with one another may cor-
respond approximately to their values,” Marx adds in II.X.15: “[The 
fact that] the commodities of the various spheres of production are sold at 
their value implies, of course, only that their value is the center of gravity 
around which prices fluctuate, and around which their rise and fall tends 
to an equilibrium.” This sentence has been often quoted in the modern 
literature on gravitation. However, it is not clear whether Marx thinks that 
the price is unique at each moment of time or, rather, that there is a con-
stellation of prices at each moment of time. The difference is substantial. 
If sellers and buyers follow mixed strategies instead of pure strategies, 
there is clearly a constellation of prices at each moment of time. Marx also 
identifies two simple cases. In the first “demand is so strong that it does 
not let up when the price is regulated by the value of commodities pro-
duced under the most unfavorable conditions” (II.X.16); in this case these 
conditions determine the market value. In the second, “the mass of the 
produced commodities exceeds the quantity which is ordinarily disposed 
of at average market-values” and, as a consequence, “the commodities 
produced under the most favorable conditions regulate the market value” 
(II.X.16). Marx is more interested in the result of this process than in the 
analysis of less simple cases.16 However, in II.X.51 he claims:
That side of competition, which is momentarily the weaker, is also that 
in which the individual acts independently of the mass of his competi-
tors and often works against them, whereby the dependence of one 
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3917. An English translation of Bertrand’s text, originally in Journal des Savants volume 48, 
pages 499–508, is provided in the appendix of Magnan de Bornier 1992.
upon the other is impressed upon them, while the stronger side always 
acts more or less unitedly against its antagonist. If the demand for this 
particular kind of commodities is larger than the supply, then one buyer 
outbids another, within certain limits, and thereby raises the price of 
the commodity for all of them above the market-price, while on the 
other hand the sellers unite in trying to sell at a high price. If, vice 
versa, the supply exceeds the demand, some one begins to dispose of 
his goods at a cheaper rate and the others must follow, while the buy-
ers unite in their efforts to depress the market-price as much as possi-
ble below the market-value. The common interest is appreciated only 
so long as each gains more by it than without it. And common action 
ceases, as soon as this or that side becomes the weaker, when each one 
tries to get out of it by his own devices with as little loss as possible. 
(emphasis added)
Here we find a clear echo of the argument used by the young Marx in 
Wage-Labour and Capital. It is also clear that the price is not unique at 
each moment of time: on the contrary, there is a constellation of prices at 
each moment of time. This fact supports our claims that the process 
needs to be analyzed under the assumption that buyers and sellers follow 
mixed strategies instead of pure strategies.
4. Classical Competition and  
Bertrand Competition
In the previous sections we outlined the classical notion of competition 
with particular concern for market price determination. In this section we 
try to answer the following question: Has the classical notion of competi-
tion percolated into modern theory? A positive answer to such a question 
would allow us to make use of some recent results in order to extend the 
analysis of market competition within classical economics.
As is well known, in 1883 the mathematician Joseph Louis François 
Bertrand wrote a review of Léon Walras’s Théorie mathématique de la 
richesse sociale (1883) and Augustin Cournot’s Recherches sur les prin-
cipes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses (1838).17 Bertrand was 
highly skeptical of the then recent blossoming of mathematical econom-
ics. In particular, he poured scorn on Cournot’s book:
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18. In Bertrand’s wording “without limits,” but this is only because in Cournot’s original 
example the marginal cost is zero. This is not the place to discuss whether Bertrand’s interpreta-
tion of Cournot is well grounded or whether Cournot actually used prices instead of quantities 
as strategic variables: see Magnan de Bornier 1992 and 2001, Dimand and Dore 1999, Morrison 
1998 and 2001.
[Cournot’s] formulae, written only in letters, bristle with unknown 
functions; [Cournot] would consider it outside his field if he were to be 
more specific. Practical economists must feel that it would be of little 
value to study such formulae, be they true or false, so they escape from 
this study by merely closing the book. If Cournot’s theory of wealth . . . 
has failed to attract any serious attention over the past century, it is 
because the ideas are lost under the profusion of algebraic signs. (quoted 
in Magnan de Bornier 1992, 647)
As concerns Cournot’s duopoly model, Bertrand claimed that, pace 
Cournot, it admitted “no solution under this assumption” (647), that is, 
under the assumption that each duopolist tries to undercut the rival in 
order to attract buyers and stops doing that only when he or she has noth-
ing more to gain from reducing his or her prices. (Note that for Bertrand 
it is Cournot himself who assumed price competition between the two 
sellers.) In short, the gist of Bertrand’s criticism is that Cournot failed to 
acknowledge that the envisaged downward movement of prices was lim-
ited only by the marginal cost.18 A somewhat similar charge of indetermi-
nacy was raised sixteen years later by a distinguished economist, Francis 
Ysidro Edgeworth, in a paper originally published in Italian in 1897 and 
translated with some modifications into English in 1925. Edgeworth went 
beyond Bertrand insofar as he claimed that the duopoly model admits a 
continuous price cycle in the presence of diminishing returns:
[The case of two identical articles] is treated by Cournot as the first step 
in the transition from monopoly to perfect competition. He concludes 
that a determinate proposition of equilibrium defined by certain quanti-
ties of the articles will be reached. Cournot’s conclusion has been 
shown to be erroneous by Bertrand for the case in which there is no cost 
of production; by Professor Marshall for the case in which the cost fol-
lows the law of increasing returns; and by the present writer for the case 
in which the cost follows the law of diminishing returns. In the last 
case there will be an indeterminate tract through which the index of 
value will oscillate, or rather will vibrate irregularly for an indefinite 
length of time. (Edgeworth 1925, 117–18; emphasis added)
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To defend this claim, Edgeworth produced a numerical example in 
which two firms compete on prices, but they have capacity constraints. 
Edgeworth showed there is no (pure strategy) equilibrium in his exam-
ple and formulated a sort of dynamic solution: firms undercut each other 
until the price becomes so low that it is convenient for a firm to quote a 
high price and sell only to the residual demand instead of undercutting 
the price quoted by the rival. As Edgeworth wrote:
At every stage in the fall of price, and before it has reached its limit-
ing value . . . , it is competent to each monopolist to deliberate whether 
it will pay him better to lower the price against his rival as already 
described, or rather to raise it to a higher, perhaps the initial, level 
for that remainder of customers of which he cannot be deprived by his 
rival (owing to the latter’s limitation of supply). Long before the low-
est point has been reached, that alternative will have become more 
advantageous than the course first described. (120)
With the development of game theory and its application to oligopoly 
models, the so-called Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, explicitly based 
on price undercutting, became a fruitful and extensively studied alter-
native to the price-taking competition embodied in the standard perfect 
competition model (see Baye and Kovenock 2008). Yet the contemporary 
Bertrand competition model is somewhat different from the original for-
mulation and from the classical notion of competition. First, it is a one-
shot game with a mixed strategy equilibrium and not a dynamic process 
of price undercutting. This feature magnifies the relevance of two miss-
ing elements in Smith’s and Marx’s writings. First is the problem of firms 
quoting the same price: in the case of a tie the firms fixing the lowest 
prices must share total demand in one way or another. This requires the 
introduction of a specific assumption in this regard. Second is the prob-
lem of how demand is rationed when a firm’s quantity demanded exceeds 
its capacity. The introduction of a demand rationing scheme is another 
assumption lacking in the classical authors.
However, a comparison between modern Bertrand competition and 
Smith’s notion of competition, and even more the story told by Marx in 
Wage-Labour and Capital, magnifies some deficiencies of the former. 
First, in the former there is a multitude of atomistic buyers described 
through a demand curve confronted with a given number of sellers, each 
defined by their costs (generally marginal costs are constant and uniform) 
and capacity. On the contrary, in Marx we find a sort of symmetry between 
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sellers and buyers. It is certainly not difficult to extend the Bertrand com-
petition model to investigate the case in which there is a multitude of 
atomistic sellers described through a supply curve confronted with a given 
number of buyers, each defined by their reservation price (possibly con-
stant and uniform) and purchasing power. Generalization to a symmetrical 
case in which a number of sellers with their costs and selling capacities are 
confronted with a number of buyers with their reservation prices and buy-
ing capacities is certainly less obvious. Second, Bertrand competition 
theorists have analyzed quite extensively the case of duopoly with constant 
marginal cost. Few contributions have investigated the oligopoly (see De 
Francesco and Salvadori 2010 and the literature cited therein). When there 
are more than two competing firms, many changes are needed. In the case 
of two firms, any firm can either undercut the other or avoid doing so. In 
the case of three or more firms, any firm can either undercut all other firms 
or just some of the firms and not others, or none of them. For example, in 
the case in which there are two (either equal or not) large firms and a 
smaller firm, the latter can avoid high prices so that the two large firms are 
not interested in undercutting it when they undercut each other at higher 
prices. The small firm can take advantage of this protection from competi-
tion with larger firms (at high prices) to obtain a larger rate of profit (see 
De Francesco and Salvadori 2010, theorem 1(c)). The analysis provided in 
the appendix may give an idea of the problems involved.
5. Final Remarks
In this article we attempted to assess the classical notion of free competi-
tion in comparison with the Walrasian notion of perfect competition. We 
showed that the latter is plagued with some logical difficulties that drasti-
cally reduce its explanatory power to equilibrium situations. Such difficul-
ties are absent in the classical notion of competition, which, contrary to 
the Walrasian one, is not based on any kind of price-taking assumption. 
Yet the former also displays some unsatisfactory aspects. In particular, 
while the classical authors extensively investigated long-period, natural 
values and gravitation, they were more sketchy on market price determi-
nation in situations of market disequilibrium. To fill this lacuna we ana-
lyzed Smith’s and Marx’s views on competition between buyers and sell-
ers. We claim that, taking inspiration from the modern theory of Bertrand 
competition, it is possible both to render Smith’s and Marx’s hints for-
mally precise and to provide interesting new questions for modern Ber-
trand competition theorists.
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3919. Note that if buyers with a reservation price larger than c exist, the monopsony price is 
larger than c.
Appendix 1
Let N be the number of buyers. Their reservation price is pb. Let B1 ≥ 
B2 … BN be the different quantities of cotton they want to buy and let 
B = B1 + B2 + … + BN. Similarly, let M be the number of sellers and c 
their reservation price. Let S1 ≥ S2 ≥ … ≥ SM be the different quantities 
of cotton they want to sell and S = S1 + S2 + … + SM. Let us assume that 
c < pb (the case in which c ≥ pb requires more accurate analysis) and that 
there are no buyers with a reservation price lower than pb and no sellers 
with a reservation price higher than c (once again, a more accurate analy-
sis would be required otherwise).
If S < B2 + … + BN, that is, if all buyers but the largest one are will-
ing to buy more than the existing amount of cotton, buyer 1 could be 
excluded from the purchase and, as a consequence, any other buyer 2, 
3, . . . , N could be excluded too. Overbidding among buyers leads the 
price of cotton to rise to pb. Therefore the best strategy for each buyer is 
to express a demand for cotton at her reservation price and the best strat-
egy for each seller is to quote the price pb. On the contrary, if B > S > B2 + … + BN, that is, if all buyers but the largest one are willing to buy 
less than the existing amount of cotton even if all buyers are willing to 
buy more than the existing amount of cotton, buyer 1 knows that she 
will certainly buy some cotton. In the limiting case in which all buyers 
2, . . . , N have purchased their desired amount of cotton, buyer 1 is a 
monopsonist in relation to the sellers who have not sold their cotton. Let 
pm be this monopsony price. Obviously, pm = c.19 Clearly, if buyers 2, 
3, . . . , N quote price pb for cotton, buyer 1 will quote price pm < pb. But 
if buyer 1 quotes price pm for cotton, (some of) the other N − 1 buyers will 
outbid her instead of quoting pb. Therefore buyer 1 will overbid on them, 
instead of quoting pm. And so on, until the price goes up so much that 
buyer 1 will prefer again to quote price pm = c and buy only S – (B2 + … + BN) units of corn. And so on and so forth. In this situation, sellers cannot 
“stand opposed to the buyers like one man” and “fold their arms in philo-
sophic contentment”: they must fight each other to sell at a higher price.
Similarly, if B < S2 + … + SM, undercutting among sellers leads the 
price of cotton to drop to c. Therefore, the best strategy for each seller is 
to quote her reservation price and the best strategy for each buyer is to 
express a demand for cotton at the price c. On the contrary, if S > B > 
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S2 + … + SM, no equilibrium price exists. Nor can an equilibrium price 
exist if S = B, since S > B2 + … + BN and B > S2 + … + SM: the larger seller 
has a realistic possibility to sell part of her cotton at pb and the larger buyer 
has a realistic possibility to buy part of the desired amount of cotton at c.
As a consequence, if B + S1 > S and S + B1 > B, both armies, to use 
Marx’s metaphor, are engaged in infighting. The best strategies for both 
buyers and sellers are not single (i.e., deterministic) prices but distribu-
tions of probability within a set of prices.
Determining such distributions of probability requires proper analysis, 
which is beyond the scope of this article. Besides, to make such calcula-
tions we need to make further assumptions not stated by Marx. In particu-
lar, we need to know how the residual demand (supply) is determined for 
sellers (buyers) quoting a price higher (lower) than that quoted by others 
sellers (buyers) and what happens in the event of a tie. What is certain is 
that buyer 1 will never quote a price lower than c (the monopsony price if 
all other buyers are served) or a price higher than pMb, defined by the con-
dition that buyer 1 gets the same profit from buying min {S, B1} at price 
pMb and buying S – (B2 + … + BN) at price c. But, as a consequence, no 
buyer will quote prices outside the range [c, pMb]. Similarly, seller 1 will 
never quote a price higher than pb (the monopoly price if all other sellers 
are served) nor a price lower than pmS, defined by the condition that seller 1 
gets the same profit from selling B – (S2 + … + SM) at price pb and selling 
min {B, S1} at price pmS. However, as a consequence, no seller will quote 
prices outside the range [pmS, pb]. Both arguments make sure that traders 
can quote only prices that are in both ranges [c, pMb] and [pmS, pb].
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